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Iran and Libya have not gone unnoticed in the international
forum, and their efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and
support of international terrorism has resulted in many persons
referring to them as "rogue regimes." The United States considers
these "rogue regimes" a threat to its foreign policy and national
security interests. When Iran opened ten petroleum development
projects to foreign investment that exceeded fifty million dollars
each, the U.S. Congress recognized the need to further strengthen
current U.S. policies limiting investment and future revenue in
Iran's oil and gas industry.1 In the same breath, Congress felt the
need to increase pressure on Tripoli to force Libyan compliance
with certain United Nations [hereinafter U.N.] Security Council
Resolutions.' As a result, Congress enacted, and President Clinton
signed, the Iran and Libyan Sanctions Act of 1996 [hereinafter the
Act] .'
The Act ultimately seeks to diminish Iran's and Libya's
ability to support international terrorism and the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction by diminishing each nation's ability to
1. H.R. Rep. No. 523, Part 1, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 10 (1996).
2. Id. See also Resolution 748 of the Security Council of the United Nations
(Mar. 31, 1992) and Resolution 883 of the Security Council of the United
Nations (Nov. 11, 1993).
3. 50 U.S.C. §1701 [hereinafter 1701]; Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541;
H.R. 3107, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996). The Act is also referred to "warmly"
by many as the "D'Amato Legislation," after Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY)
who was a primary sponsor of the Senate version of the House bill that is the
current Act.
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acquire funds through future investment in either country's
,petroleum resources or Libya's aviation and military resources To
accomplish this goal, the Act imposes sanctions on persons
exporting certain goods or technology, or making investments that
would enhance either country's ability to explore for, extract,
refine, or transport petroleum resources.5  It appears to be
Congress' belief that the threat of imposing sanctions for making oil
and gas investments in Iran and Libya will further dissuade the two
countries from supporting international terrorism and from
acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The Act specifically
declares this to be the policy of the United States with respect to
both countries.6
The Act, however, possesses a somewhat broader purpose
than merely seeking to curtail new investment in Iran or Libya.' In
passing what some term "secondary boycott" legislation, and what
some foreign nations have condemned as controversial and
extraterritorial, the U.S. Congress and President have sought to
push forward using diplomatic efforts with the U.S. allies to
establish a multilateral trade sanctions regime against Iran, and to
4. The expectation of Congress is that the sanctions imposed by the Act will
create a shortage of hard currency and an inability to repay the national debt.
S.R Rep. No. 187, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1996). See also H.R. Rep. No.
523, Part 2, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1996).
5. H.R. Rep. No. 523, Part 1, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1996).
6. Id. In signing the Iran and Libyan Sanctions Act of 1996, President Clinton
stated that America has felt the "pain of terrorism" from Lockerbie to Khobar
Towers and the World Trade Center to Centennial Park. Remarks by the
President at Signing Ceremony for Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, The White
House, Office of the Press Secretary (Aug. 5, 1996) [hereinafter Remarks by the
President].
7. Because the Act applies prospectively only, it is important to note that any
investments made prior to its signing on August 5, 1996 are not within the
purview of the Act. Therefore, the Act applies only to new investments in Iran
and Libya under the conditions so stipulated.
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ensure Libyan compliance with U.N. resolutions.8 It is important
to recognize this effort when other nations describe the Act as
offensive,9 and encroaching on the rights of foreign corporations'
and financial institutions' decision to invest in either of the two
"rogue regimes"' petroleum resources. 10 Immediately prior to the
signing of the Act, at the G-7 Summit in Paris, several nations
8. Reacting to passage of the House bill, H.R. 3107, in a letter to members
of the House International Relations Committee, the European Union stated its
concern over the bill's extraterritorial reach. Jim Berger, House Committee
Approves Tough Iran Sanctions Bill, WASH. TRADE DAILY 5 (Trade Reports Int'l
Group) Mar. 21 and 22, 1996.
9. In fact, one may classify the Act as almost purely extraterritorial in nature
as there are presently various regulations controlling and prohibiting trade and
transactions with Iran and Libya by U.S. persons. The two nations are currently
"trade embargoed" by the United States for purposes of trade with U.S. persons
and entities. Such regulations are administered and enforced by the U.S.
Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control. See also Foreign
Assets Control Regulations... for Exporters and Importers, U.S. Department
of the Treasury (Jul. 11, 1996).
The Libyan Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 550, et. seq., established
economic sanctions against Libya in 1986. The Iranian Assets Control
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 535, et. seq., controlling Iranian assets held within the
United States, was effective in 1979, and the Iranian Transactions Regulations,
31 C.F.R. § 560, et. seq., prohibiting or severely limiting transactions and trade
with Iran was promulgated in the late 1980s. These regulations "affect all U.S.
citizens and permanent residents wherever they are located, all people and
organizations physically in the Unites States, and all branches of U.S.
organizations throughout the world," and prohibit all contracts, loans, and
financial transactions with Libya.
On March 15, 1995, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12957
prohibiting U.S. involvement with the development of petroleum resources in
Iran. A May 6, 1995 Executive Order, No. 12959, among other things,
prohibited new investments by U.S. persons in Iran. On January 2, 1997,
President Clinton signed a notice continuing the Libyan Emergency which was
published at 62 F.R. 587 (Jan. 3, 1997). Although there may be specific and
limited instances in which trade with Iran and Libya may take place, this paper
does not concentrate on or cover such topic.
10. § 1701, §§ 3-4.
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agreed to a comprehensive set of measures to prevent terrorist acts
and to apprehend them when they accomplish their goal."
Undoubtedly, the Act is a unilateral effort by the United States to
further advance the interests of several nations to prevent the spread
of terrorism, even if by the imposition of "new sanctions on foreign
companies that engage in specified economic transactions with Iran
or Libya.,, 2
II. INVESTMENTS TARGETED BY THE ACr
The Act intentionally discusses prohibitions on investment
with respect to Iran and Libya separately due to the different
economic histories and distinct geopolitical circumstances of both
countries. While any person who makes certain investments in Iran
that enhance its ability to develop petroleum resources is subject to
the Act's sanctions, the triggering of sanctions with regard to Libya
is broader. A person 3 becomes subject to sanctions not only for
becoming involved in certain investments or trade within the Libyan
oil and gas sectors, as with Iran, but also opens the door to the
possible imposition of sanctions due to the provision of goods and
services that contribute to Libya's ability to enhance its military
prowess and oil and gas development.
11. Remarks by the President, supra note 6.
12. Fact Sheet, The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, The White House,
Office of the Press Secretary (Aug. 5, 1996).
13. § 1701, § 14(14). A "person" is defined under the Act as a natural person,
corporation, business association, organization, partnership and any successor
entity of such person, and the general definition does not distinguish between a
U.S. and a foreign person. This list is not exclusive, but the most generally
applicable terms have been cited. The Act specifically defines U.S. person and
foreign person, for the purpose of designating exceptions and waivers under the
Act, but provides a general definition of "any person," (that is read to include
both U.S. and foreign persons) to which sanctions may be applied.
1996-97]
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The Act subjects any person, whether a foreign person or a
U.S. person, to possible sanctions. 4 The Act mandates sanctions
be imposed upon: (1) any person who the President determines to
be a successor entity; (2) any parent or subsidiary of that person
who, with actual knowledge, engaged in activities violative of the
Act; and (3) any affiliate of that person who is "controlled in fact"
by such person, and with actual knowledge, engaged in the
sanctionable activities. 5  The legislation intends that "the
Administration have broad latitude in making determinations" as to
the imposition of sanctions under § 5 of the Act, possibly making
such determination dependent upon the circumstances of each
separate investment. 6 The President has delegated to the U.S. State
Department's Iran and Libya Sanctions Unit, Office of Economic
Sanctions Policy, the responsibility of administering the Act. 7
A. With Respect to Iran
The President must impose sanctions on any person found,
on or after August 5, 1996, to have with "actual knowledge:"
made an investment of $40 million or more (or any
combination of investments of at least $10 million,
which in the aggregate equals or exceeds $40 million
14. Section 5(d) of § 1701 requires the President to publish in the Federal
Register "a current list of persons and entities on whom sanctions have been
imposed under this Act. The removal of persons or entities from, and the
addition of persons and entities to, the list, shall also be published." Likewise,
§ 5(e) requires publication of a list of all significant projects publicly tendered in
the oil and gas sector in Iran.
15. §1701, §5.
16. H.R. Rep. No. 523, Part 2, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1996). The
provisions of the Act do not apply to activities subject to various reporting
requirements of Title 5 of the National Security Act of 1947. H.R. 3107 § 12.
17. 61 Fed. Reg. 66067 (Dec. 16, 1996).
[Vol. 5
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in any 12-month period), that directly and
significantly contributed to the enhancement of
Iran's ability to develop petroleum resources of
Iran."s
However, due to the continued threat of Iran's efforts in pursuing
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international
terrorism, the Act imposes further constraints that effect a change
in the investment threshold 9 described above. Within one year of
the date of enactment, the President must report to the appropriate
congressional committees ° on the degree of success of multilateral
negotiations to establish multilateral sanctions against Iran.2' Once
the President makes such a report, the threshold monetary amounts
described in § 5(a) above will be decreased by half.2 Thus, upon
making the report, the allowable threshold for investments
18. § 1701, § 5(a).
19. Otherwise known as the "trigger" amount or "trade trigger."
20. The appropriate Senate committees include Finance; Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs; Foreign Relations; the appropriate committees of the House of
Representatives include Ways and Means; Banking and Financial Services; and
International Relations. H.R. 3107 § 14(2).
21. § 1701, § 4(b). Such multilateral sanctions are expected to include
provisions inhibiting Iran's efforts to perform, facilitate, or encourage acts of
international terrorism and the nation's proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction by limiting the development of petroleum resources in Iran. Id. at
§ 4(a).
22. § 1701, § 4(d). The President may grant a waiver of this section to any
national of a country if that country has agreed to take substantial measures,
including economic sanctions or suppressing Iran's efforts in the "proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and acts of international terrorism." Such waiver
is conditioned upon the President providing (1) a report to the appropriate
congressional committees as described above; and (2) notification to such
committees at least thirty days before the waiver is to take place. Id. at
§ 4(c)(1)(2).
1996-97]
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decreases with respect to Iran, and any person who makes an
investment, as defined under the Act, of twenty million dollars or
more, or a combination of investments of five million dollars or
more that in the aggregate exceed twenty million dollars in any
twelve month period, can be sanctioned.23
If a person makes an investment of the type described above,
the President is required to impose two or more of the sanctions
listed in § 6 of the Act.24 The language throughout § 5 of the Act
is clearly prospective in nature, and sanctions may be applied only
for violations after enactment. 2 However, the element of "intent"
within the language of the Act should not be overlooked. In order
for sanctions to apply, the President must determine that the
violator has "acted with actual knowledge" in making an investment
as described above. It is only necessary that the person act with the
knowledge that the investment contributes to the country's
development of petroleum resources, not that the investment
contributes to the country's development of petroleum resources.
B. With Respect to Libya
The imposition of sanctions can be triggered for taking part
in either trade or investment with Libya. Under § 5(b)(1)26 of the
Act, mandatory sanctions will apply to any person who, on or after
the date of enactment:
exported, transferred, or otherwise provided to
Libya any goods, services, technology or other items
the provision of which is prohibited under paragraph
23. Id.
24. Sanctions will be discussed shortly in Section IV.
25. H.R. Res. 523, Part 2, 19.
26. §1701, §5(b).
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4(b) or 5 of Resolution 74827 of the Security Council
of the United Nations, adopted March 31, 1992, or
under paragraph 5 or 6 of Resolution 883 of the
Security Council of the United Nations, adopted
November 11, 1993, if the provision of such items
significantly and materially -
(1) contributed to Libya's ability to acquire chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons or destabilizing
numbers and types of advanced conventional
weapons or enhanced Libya's paramilitary
capabilities;
(2) contributed to Libya's ability to develop its
petroleum resources; or
(3) contributed to Libya's ability to maintain its aviation
capabilities. 9
Sanctions under § 5(b)(2) will be imposed upon any person
if it is determined that such person:
27. S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 3063rd mtg. at 4(b) and 5 (1992). Sections
4(b) and 5 of Resolution 748 prohibit: (1) the provision of aircraft parts and
components to Libya; (2) payment of claims under insurance contracts dealing
with aircraft; and (3) the sale or transfer of military weapons and equipment, as
well as training, assistance and advice.
28. S.C. Res. 883, U.N. SCOR, 3312th mtg. at 5 and 6 (1993). Sections 5
and 6 of Resolution 883 prohibit the export or sale of equipment for use in crude
oil export terminals; pumps with certain capacity for use in transporting crude
oil and natural gas; other equipment that may be used in, although not designed
for, crude oil export terminals; and materials, equipment or insurance related to
the maintenance, etc. of Libyan aircraft.
29. §1701, § 5(b)(1).
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made an investment of $40 million or more (or any
combination of investments of at least $10 million,
which in the aggregate equals or exceeds $40 million
in any 12-month period), that directly and
significantly contributed to the enhancement of
Libya's ability to develop its petroleum resources.3"
As with Iran, sanctions may be applied only if it is
determined that the person had "actual knowledge" that such an
investment would directly and significantly benefit Libya's oil and
gas sector, or exporting certain goods to Libya in violation of § 5
of the Act. If the President finds that a person has violated the Act,
he is required to impose two or more of the sanctions listed in § 6
on such person.31
C. Investments Can Still Be Made
While the crux of the Act is intended to prohibit investments
in the oil and gas sectors of both Iran and Libya, such investments
are not truly forbidden. In fact, the forty million dollar trigger, or
combination of four investments of at least ten million dollars in
any twelve month period, limits only the type of investment that can
be made given a designated monetary amount. For instance, a
foreign financial institution or corporation may contract with an
Iranian or Libyan entity by making an investment of under forty
million dollars, or any combination of investments of less than
ten million dollars each within any twelve month period, so long as
in the aggregate the forty million dollars threshold is not triggered.
Likewise, a person may make numerous investments of less than
30. §1701, §5(b)(2).
31. Id.
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ten million dollars each during the course of a year without
triggering the Act's sanctions.32
It is unclear, however, whether a person may enter into a
contract for the payment of a combination of investments less than
ten million dollars each or payments of varying amounts, but in the
aggregate exceed the forty million dollar threshold and are paid
over a period greater than twelve months. In other words, it is
uncertain whether such a contract having a total investment value
that exceeds forty million dollars would be characterized as
"making an investment of forty million dollars or more. " It is also
uncertain whether the Act is to be interpreted as requiring a single
payment of forty million dollars or more in order to trigger the
imposition of sanctions. While the Act is triggered if a person
either invests forty million dollars or makes four distinct
investments of ten million dollars or more in a twelve month period
that in total exceed forty million dollars, the Act does not grant an
explicit explanation of what is considered an investment of forty
million dollars. Likewise, the accompanying legislative history
neither describes nor discusses what is meant by a forty million
dollar investment. It would appear that the Act, in distinguishing
two types of investment activities and the monetary limitations on
each, provides for two instances in which a person can be
sanctioned: (1) a single investment of forty million dollars; or (2)
four payments of ten million dollars that total forty million dollars.
What constitutes an investment in terms of monetary
requirements and pay period may be interpreted quite
conservatively by the President to mean a contract that provides a
total investment of forty million dollars, regardless of the method
of payment or time period over which payment is made. It is
questionable, therefore, whether a contract that includes several
payments that in the aggregate exceed the forty million dollar "trade
32. However, it must be recognized that with regard to Iran, as discussed
earlier, the threshold amount decreases to twenty million dollars and five million
dollars respectively. §1701, §4(c)(1)(2).
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trigger" would be considered an investment causing the person to
be subject to sanctions under the Act. Clarification by Congress
through the appropriate Congressional hearings is necessary to
interpret not only the Act's ambiguities, but Congressional intent,
before the promulgation of regulations implementing the Act.33
III. WHAT TYPE OF INVESTMENT AcTIvrrY DOES THE ACT
COVER?
While the meaning of "investment" is very narrow as stated
in the Act, a reading of the House Committee reports helps to place
its meaning in perspective for purposes of §§ 5(a) and (b)(2). The
Act defines "investment" as:
(A) The entry into a contract that includes responsibility
for the development of petroleum resources located
either in Iran or Libya (as the case may be), or entry
into a contract providing for the general supervision
and guarantee of another person's performance of
such a contract;
(B) The purchase of a share of ownership, including an
equity interest, in that development;
(C) The entry into a contract providing for the
participation in royalties, earnings, or profits in that
development without regard to the form of the
participation.34
33. Congressional oversight hearings are expected to take place next year to
examine the Act's effectiveness and determine whether revisions in the law need
to be made. The appropriate committees to hold a hearing on the Act would most
likely be the Senate Finance Committee, the House International Relations
Subcommittee on Banking and Financial Services, or the House Ways and Means
Subcommittee on Trade.
34. § 1701, § 14(9)(A)(B)(C).
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Any of the above-mentioned investment activities constitutes
an investment for purposes of the Act if undertaken pursuant to an
agreement, or the exercise of rights under an agreement, entered
into with an Iranian or Libyan government or a nongovernmental
entity." Given the above definition, "investment" may include
general contracts for: (1) the development of petroleum resources;
(2) the supervision and guarantee of such development projects; and
(3) the acquisition of an ownership interest (share or participation)
in the profits of those projects. 6
The Act appears to make clear that for a person to be held
liable or sanctionable for investment activities, such activities must
be direct and with the intent to accomplish the objective of
enhancing Iran's or Libya's development of petroleum resources.
The Act does not reach so far as to include investments by foreign
firms, or financing by foreign institutions, of a party who: (1) is on
the Office of Foreign Assets Control [hereinafter OFAC] sanction
list;37 (2) may be a sanctioned person under the Act; or (3) has,
will, or is currently investing in Iran or Libya or actively trading
with either nation. 8 The language of the Act does not purport to
include, or rather preclude, such dealings or transactions with
particular persons by foreign entities.39 What the Act does cover is
35. Id.
36. H. R. Rep. No. 523, Part 2, at 14 (1996).
37. OFAC has also compiled a list of persons, foreign and domestic, with
whom trade and transactions are prohibited by U.S. persons. OFAC is the office
within the U.S. Department of Treasury that administers regulations enacted
governing trade with embargoed countries.
38. Telephone conference with Ms. Barbara Hammerle, Counsel, U.S.
Department of Treasury, OFAC, Washington, D.C. (Aug. 20, 1996).
39. Id. The House Committee on International Relations in its report on House
Bill 3107, precursor to the present enacted legislation, stated that "[tihe
Committee does not intend that the sanctions provided in [section 5 of the Act]
would extend to portfolio investments made by any other person in a sanctioned
1996-97]
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the distinct transaction itself. U.S. persons, however, must
maintain compliance with all other U.S. government regulations and
requirements related to involvement or trade with Iran or Libya,
persons sanctioned" under the Act, and persons on the OFAC
sanctions list. The ability of the President to sanction a person will
depend upon the type of discrete transaction entered into, which
means that liability under the Act may be highly fact dependent in
any given situation.
"Investment" does not include the financing of,
performance, or entry into a contract for the sale or purchase of
goods, services, or technology. 4' A review of what little legislative
history is available reveals that the provisions of the Act do not deal
with finance or trade generally, but focus on specific transactions.
The Committee on International Relations in its report on the House
bill recognized:
the intent of the legislation is not to apply sanctions
on the transfer of all petroleum and natural gas-
related products being acquired by Iran or Libya.
The Administration is specifically given the
discretion of deciding which goods and services
would significantly and materially enhance Iran's
ability to develop its petroleum resources. In the
view of the Committee, the Administration has the
flexibility it needs in implementing this provision
with a view toward denying Iran those key goods
person." This legislative history further signifies that the Act's intent is not to
curtail investments with persons sanctioned under the Act, but rather to curtail
investment in the development of Iran's and Libya's petroleum resources. H.R.
Rep. No. 523, Part 1,at 14 (1996).
40. See also § 1701, § 6(3), which allows the U.S. Government at its
discretion to limit the ability of U.S. financial institutions to make loans or
provide credit to persons sanctioned under the Act.
41. §1701, §14(9).
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and technology items needed to develop its offshore
oil resources.42
It is believed by Congress that such broad provisions
affecting foreign trade will be far less effective against the two
governments, and will be an enormous enforcement burden on any
federal agency.43 Thus, investment under the Act explicitly
excludes the sale of goods such as those used in petroleum
operations, or any other goods to be exported to Iran or Libya in
compliance with OFAC and the U.S. Department of Commerce
Bureau of Export Administration regulations, and with respect to
Libya, U.N. Security Resolutions 748 and 883.'
If the Act's legislative history is indicative of its application,
companies "may perform existing contracts, and complete existing
investments, such as subcontracts, farm-in arrangements, and the
like in connection with contracts entered into prior to August 5,
1996. "45
IV. THE Acr's SANCrIONS
Imposition of sanctions on persons violating the Act are
mandatory with respect to both Iran and Libya. The Act
specifically discusses sanctions with regard to the two countries
separate and apart from each other, as the criteria for each differs
to some extent. Under the Act, all persons are prohibited from
exporting, transferring, or releasing certain listed goods and
technologies to, or making certain investments in, Iran or Libya,
with Iranian or Libyan nationals, or with governmental and non-
42. H.R. Rep. No. 523, Part 1, at 14 (1996).
43. Id.
44. See also H.R. Rep. No. 523, Part 2 (1996).
45. 61 Fed. Reg. 66067 (Dec. 19, 1996).
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governmental entities owned or controlled by Iran or Libya.4 6 The
general focus of the Act is to impede the development of petroleum
resources in either of the two "rogue regimes." The Act applies
prospectively only, and nowhere is it stated that the President can
apply or maintain sanctions against any person for contracts entered
into, or investments made, before the date on which the Act became
effective.47 The law imposes sanctions upon any person that the
President determines had actual knowledge that the investment
contributed to the development of petroleum resources, and any
successor entity to that person and any subsidiary or affiliate of that
person that, with actual knowledge, engaged in the sanctionable
activities.' Thus, only knowledge that the investment enhances the
country's ability to develop petroleum resources, rather than the
person's awareness of a violation of the Act, is necessary for the
imposition of sanctions.
Assuming a finding is made that the person has actual
knowledge that they will take part in an investment enhancing the
development of petroleum resources in either Iran or Libya, it must
next be determined whether such person's action contributed
"directly and significantly" or "significantly and materially" to such
development.49 The Act, however, does not define what is meant
by either of the two phrases or any one of the terms. The decision
or determination of whether a person's investment contributes
46. H.R. Rep. No. 523, Part 2. Such goods and services are prohibited under
UN Security Council Resolutions 748 and 883.
47. § 1701, §§ 5(a), (b).
48. Id. § 5(a). With respect to successor entities, subsidiaries, and affiliates,
the House Report language suggests that such persons may be found liable under
the Act if they merely had reason to know they were engaged in sanctionable
activity. The report language, therefore, has a lesser degree of an intent element
than does the actual language of the Act itself. H.R. Rep. No. 523, Part 1, at 14
(1996).
49. § 1701, § 5(2).
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"directly and significantly" or "significantly and materially" to such
development rests with the President or federal agency
administering the Act." The President's or agency's determination
of the two phrases may be determined on a case by case basis,
being fact specific, or the phrases and words as applicable to the
Act may be later defined by the promulgation of regulations
interpreting the Act." In any event, the interpretation is subject to
"arbitrary and capricious" judicial review. Because of the short
history of the Act, it has not yet been enforced against any single
person, nor have any of the above terms been adequately defined
under the Act.
The provisions of the Act do allow for the imposition of
sanctions against foreign persons,52 entities and financial
institutions, as they are included in the Act's general definition of
"any person. ' " The Act requires mandatory sanctions to be
imposed in both §§ 5(a) and (b). The President must impose two
or more of the following sanctions in response to a violation of the
Act:
(1) The President may direct the Export-Import Bank of
the United States not to guarantee, insure, extend
credit, or participate in the extension of credit in
connection with the export of any goods or services
to any sanctioned person;
50. Hammerle, supra note 38.
51. Id.
52. Foreign persons include individuals who are not citizens of the United
States and corporations or partnerships that are not a "U.S. person." § 1701,
§ 14(7). TheAct intentionally provides three definitions of persons, that of "any
person" (§ 14(14)), a "foreign person" (§ 14(7)), and a "U.S. person" (§ 14(17)),
leading to the presumption upon review of the Act in its entirety that the
definition of any person in § 5 includes foreign persons.
53. H.R. Rep. No. 523, Part 1, at 14 (1996).
1996-971
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(2) The President may order the U.S. Government not
to issue any specific license and not to grant any
other specific permission or authority to export any
goods or technology to a sanctioned person under --
(i) The Export Administration Act of 1979;
(ii) The Arms Export Control Act;
(iii) The Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or
(iv) any other statute that requires the prior
review and approval of the U.S. Government
as a condition for the export or re-export of
goods or services.
(3) The U.S. Government may prohibit any U.S.
financial institution from making any loan or
providing any credit to a sanctioned person in an
amount exceeding $10,000,000 [or two or more
loans of more than $5,000,000 each in any 12-month
period] unless such person is engaged in activities to
relieve human suffering and the loan(s) or credit is
provided for such activities.
(4) The following prohibitions may be imposed against
a sanctioned person that is a financial institution:
(i) Neither the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System nor the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York may designate,
or permit the continuation of any prior
designation of, such financial institution as a
primary dealer in U.S. Government debt
instruments;
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(ii) Such financial institution shall not serve as
agent of the U.S. Government or as
repository for U.S. Government funds. 4
(5) The U.S. Government may not procure, or enter
into any contract for the procurement of, any goods
or services from a sanctioned person.
(6) The President, in accordance with the International
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. § 1701, et seq.),
may impose sanctions, as appropriate, to restrict
imports with respect to a sanctioned person. 5
Any sanction imposed under § 5 of the Act will remain in
effect for a minimum period of two years or until the President
finds that the person on whom sanctions were imposed is no longer
engaging in such activities. 6 However, if the President so finds,
the person must provide "reliable assurances" that he or she will not
knowingly engage in such activities in the future, and that sanctions
will continue to be imposed for a period of at least one year. 7
Finally, sanctions imposed, or a determination made to impose
sanctions, under the Act is not reviewable in any court in the United
States, whether it be a court of federal, state, or local jurisdiction. 8
54. § 1701, § 6(4)(A) or (B). The imposition of either one of the sanctions
counts only as one sanction having been imposed on a person.
55. Id. §§ 6(1)-(6). Section 1701, et seq. grants the President authority to
regulate or prohibit transactions, including inports/exports and entry into
contracts, with other nations to deal with any "unusual and extraordinary" threat
to national security.
56. !d. § 9(b).
57. Id.
58. Id. § 11.
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V. EXCEPTIONS, DELAY, AND WAIVER OF SANCTIONS
The Act provides for specific exceptions to the application
of sanctions, and for the delay and waiver of sanctions upon the
President's initiative. The apparent intent is to allow activities to
continue or take place with foreign nations or nationals if it is in the
interest of the U.S. government. Although this may be termed by
some as protectionism, it does show the need to participate in trade
with the two countries. Under § 5(f), certain exceptions are
provided under which the President is not required to impose
sanctions upon a person violating the Act, but it is within his
discretion to do so.
A majority of the exceptions are very narrow and apply to
the procurement of defense articles or services for the United States
in the following situations: (1) the procurement of commodities or
articles by a U.S. entity or U.S. national for defense services under
existing contracts or subcontracts, including the exercise of options
for the production of essential quantities; (2) upon a determination
by the President that the goods either cannot be obtained elsewhere
as the person is a "sole source supplier" of such essential defense
articles or services, and alternative sources are not readily or
reasonably available; (3) the articles are essential to national
security under a defense co-production agreement; and (4) the
eligible product is procured pursuant to the Trade Agreements Act
of 1979." 9 Exceptions also can be granted for (1) contracts for
products, technology, or services entered into before the date on
which the President publishes in the Federal Register the person's
name on whom sanctions are to be imposed; (2) spare parts,
component parts6 essential to U.S. products or production, as well
as routine maintenance, if not otherwise readily available;
(3) information and information technology essential to U.S.
59. Id. §§ 5(t)(1)-(7). The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 [hereinafter Trade
Agreements Actl can be found at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2518(4) and 2511 (b)(1).
60. Finished products are not included hi the applicable exceptions.
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products or production; and (4) the export or transhipment of
medicines, medical supplies and other humanitarian items."
Sanctions under § 5(a) and (b) may be delayed with respect
to a foreign person for a period of up to ninety days, allowing the
President to pursue consultations with the foreign person's
government regarding its policy toward Iran and/or Libya.62 Unless
the President makes a finding that the foreign government has taken
"specific and effective actions," including penalties as appropriate,
to terminate the foreign person's activities causing such person to
violate the Act, he must immediately impose sanctions upon such
person.6 3 However, if after the initial ninety days, the President
continues consultation with the foreign government having primary
jurisdiction over the person, he may further delay the imposition of
sanctions for up to an additional ninety days upon certification of
such consultation to Congress.'
Not only may the President delay the imposition of
sanctions, but he has the right to waive sanctions applicable to any
person or to continue imposition of the sanctions. A waiver of
sanctions can occur only if it is determined that a waiver is
"important to the national interest. "65 This is further conditioned
upon the President submitting a report notifying the appropriate
Congressional committees of his intention to exercise the waiver
61. See Trade Agreements Act, supra note 59. Medicines, medical supplies
and other humanitarian items, if exported or transhipped by a U.S. person to Iran
or Libya, must be donated and cannot be included in, or be part of, a commercial
transaction. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 535, et. seq and 550 et. seq.
62. Id. §§ 9(a)(I) and (2). The President is also required to submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report of his consultation progress with
the foreign government no later than 90 days after making a determination under
§ 5(a) or (b). Id. § 9(a)(4).
63. Id.
64. Id. § 9(a)(3).
65. Id. § 9(c)(1).
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thirty days before it is destined to take effect.66 The report must
provide "specific and detailed rationale" for the waiver, include a
description of the conduct that resulted in a violation of the Act, and
estimate the significance of the investment to Iran's or Libya's
ability to develop petroleum and other resources as described in
§§ 5(a) and (b) by the granting of a waiver."7 If the sanctioned
person is a foreign person, the report must also include a response
as to the cooperation of the foreign government toward ending the
sanctioned person's actions.6"
The Act does provide for a case-by-case review to determine
whether a person's proposed activity would subject such person to
sanctions. Upon request, the Secretary of State may issue an
advisory opinion rendering such a determination.69 "This provision
provides an opportunity for persons to investigate ahead of time
whether proposed behavior is of a sanctionable nature." 7o If the
proposed activity or certain actions are found not to be sanctionable,
the petitioner may in good faith rely upon the opinion and
participate or engage in the activity without fear of being
sanctioned. 7
VI. TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS
Sanctions may be terminated with regard to both Iran and
Libya under specific conditions. Sanctions with regard to Iran will
be terminated, or shall no longer have force or effect, upon (1) a
66. Id.
67. Id. §9(c)(2).
68. Id. § 9(c)(2)(B).
69. Id. § 7.
70. H.R. Rep., No. 523, Part 2, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1996).
71. § 1701, § 7.
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determination by the President; and (2) certification to the
-appropriate congressional committees that Iran has become a
country of non-proliferation and is removed from the list of
countries that have repeatedly provided support for acts of
iriternational terrorism. 2 With regard to Libya, sanctions are
terminated if the President determines and certifies that Libya has
fulfilled the requirements of U.N. Security Council Resolutions
731, 748, and 883. 73 However, the Act does have a "sunset
provision" causing it to cease to be effective five years after the date
of enactment. 74
VII. ALLIES WITH THE UNITED STATES, OR ALLIED AGAINST THE
UNITED STATES?
While the Act is intended to deter Iran and Libya "from
supporting acts of international terrorism and acquiring weapons of
mass destruction," perhaps a more significant but less recognized
purpose is the attempt at creating a multilateral sanctions regime
uniting foreign nations in a unified front against Iran to prevent the
nation from conducting such activities. 5 In beginning multilateral
negotiations, the President is authorized by Congress to make
diplomatic efforts in the "appropriate international fora" and
bilaterally with U.S. allies. 6 The primary goal of such negotiations
is to establish a multilateral sanctions regime against Iran through
72. Id. § 8(a). The list of countries that have provided support for acts of
international terrorism may be found in the Export Administration Act of 1979,
§ 60).
73. Id. § 8(b).
74. Id. § 13. As stated earlier, the provisions of this Act take effect on August
5, 1996, the date of enactment.
75. H. R. Rep. No. 523, Part 2, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1996).
76. § 1701, § 4(a).
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diplomatic efforts by encouraging countries to take significant
measures against Iran to restrict its ability to obtain funding from
foreign sources.77
Yet, the ultimate question of whether the Act can advance
such efforts lead by the United States is difficult to predict.
Although the President has great latitude in waiving and delaying
the application of sanctions with respect to foreign nationals,78 even
the U.S. State Department revealed its concern that the threat of
"imposing trade sanctions may decrease the amount of cooperation"
that can be expected from allies.79 The effect of the Act is without
a doubt far-reaching, breeding concern by foreign firms and
corporations over the extent of its application. Some foreign
interests have stated their belief that the United States, or any other
country, should not unilaterally use its economic prowess to dictate
other countries' trading partners and investment opportunities.8 "
Even so, in hearings held by the House International Relations
Committee on the legislation, it was expressed by Congress that the
United States should use its economic abilities as a peaceful tool of
77. Id. At various intervals, the President must report to the appropriate
Congressional committees those countries having agreed to undertake substantial
measures to further the objectives of the Act. On November 5, 1996, the
President was required to submit to the appropriate Congressional Committees
an interim report on multilateral sanctions stating whether the member countries
of the European Union, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Israel, or Japan have
either legislative or administrative standards that provide for sanctions as does the
Act. §1701, § 4(e).
78. Id. § 4 and § 9.
79. Barbara Larkin, U.S. State Department, Testimony before the House
International Relations Committee, Mark-up of the Iranian Oil Sanctions Act of
1996 (Mar. 21, 1996).
80. See Jane Collin, European Companies Prepare Their Attack On Aide to
D'Anato, THE OIL DAILY, Oct. 29, 1996 at 7.
Unilateralism as a Defense Mechanism
foreign diplomacy. 8' Before the House Ways and Means
Subcommittee on Trade at a hearing on the House bill, which
ultimately became the Act, Ambassador Jennifer Hillman, U.S.
Office of Trade Representative, stated:
[o]ur trading partners have expressed concern that
H.R. 3107 and similar legislation are simply further
evidence of U.S. unilateralism that will destroy the
multilateral trading system. We must take care to
measure the impact of any alternative on our trading
partners, on the multilateral trading system and on
U.S. business and economic interests.82
On October 1, 1996, the European Union's Council of
Ministers [hereinafter Ministers] began their legal challenge to the
United States' use of measures such as the Iran and Libyan
Sanctions Act. 3 The Ministers of the fifteen Member Nations
pronounced their full-fledged support for retaliatory measures in the
form of regulations that would forbid European Union companies
from complying with the Act.84 The Council stated that "wherever
81. Congressman Robert Menendez, Opening Statement before the House
International Relations Committee, Mark-up of the Iranian Oil Sanctions Act of
1996 (Mar. 21, 1996).
82. Ambassador Jennifer Hillman, General Counsel, Office of U.S. Trade
Representative, Testimony before the House Ways and Means Trade
Subcommittee, hearing on the Iranian Oil Sanctions Act of 1996 (May 22, 1996).
83. Bureau of National Affairs, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUrIVES, Section A,
191, Oct. 2, 1996.
84. Id. In the same meeting, the European Union Council of Ministers voted
unanimously to give the European Commission authorization to call for a WTO
dispute panel to convene and discuss the Helms-Burton Law. The Helms-Burton
Law allows U.S. citizens to sue foreign corporations and firms that benefit or
profit from trafficking in U.S. property expropriated by the Cuban government.
This result further emphasizes the possibility that with the enforcement of the
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the Iran-Libya law had specific relevant laments," retaliation
measures should apply.85 Due to the controversial nature of the
Act, officials in the Clinton Administration admit that a World
Trade Organization challenge is possible.8 6
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act can confidently be
described as a defense mechanism to be enforced unilaterally by the
United States. What should concern the United States is the view
foreign nations will take regarding the extraterritorial application of
the Act, and the likelihood of retaliatory measures such nations may
take in response to enforcement of the Act. Presently, only the
threat of enforcement and sanctions under the Act rings in the ears
of foreign entities considering investment in either Iran or Libya.
Until the Act is enforced against a sanctionable party, or
regulations are promulgated by the U.S. federal agency selected to
administer the Act, the true reach and application of the Act will
remain vague.87 Such vagueness necessitates clarification through
Iran and Libyan Sanctions Act, application to a WTO panel to rule on its
legitimacy in the international arena may be forthcoming. Id.
However, Denmark has threatened to veto a "blocking statute" recently
proposed by the European Union which would prohibit European entities from
complying with the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act. Spanner in the Works 1, FIN.
TIMEs, Oct. 23, 1996. Denmark argues that the EC is exceeding its authority by
basing the statute on the "catch-all Article 235" of the European Union treaty.
Id.
85. Id.
86. Berger, supra note 8. It also has been the stated opinion of the Office of
U.S. Trade Representative that "[enforcement of H.R. 3107] would violate
NAFTA and WTO... " Testimony by Ambassador Hillman, supra note 82.
87. On November 1, 1996, the U.S. government formally denied that it is
planning to impose sanctions against Petronas, Malaysia's national oil company,
due to its "30 percent stake in a $600 million project" in the development of
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Congressional hearings to determine Congress' true intent so that
appropriate regulations can be promulgated by the administering or
enforcing agency. In the meantime, the threat of sanctions under
the Act and the unknowing reach of the consequences of being
sanctioned, has already caused both U.S. and foreign oil and gas
companies to avoid highly lucrative investment opportunities with
Iran.8" The full effect of the Act on U.S. business abroad has not
yet surfaced, and if it does, Congress and the President are likely
to bear much pressure from U.S. corporations in taking certain
enforcement actions. And, unless the U.S. government eventually
follows some future directive of the World Trade Organization and
sets aside the new law, financial institutions will have to perform
additional due diligence in assessing the legality of underlying
transactions or face denial of participation in certain U.S. programs.
The enactment of this legislation is obviously another step
forward by the United States in its attempt to bring together the
international community in a struggle for world peace. Whether
U.S. allies will ultimately adhere to the United States' trade policies
in relation to Iran and Libya remains to be seen, and the continued
pursuit by the United States in assuring compliance with the Act
will certainly be debated in the 105th Congress. Congress'
passionate support over the past year of "extraterritorial" legislation
such as the Iran and Libyan Oil Sanctions Act emphasizes the
strong position certain to continue next session.
Iranian oil fields in the Persian Gulf. No U.S. Sanctions Planned Against
Malaysian Oil Firm For Iranian Dealings, DAILY EXECUTIVE REPORTER, Nov.
11, 1996 atA-1.
88. See Jareer Elass, D'Amato Aide Raises Possibility of New Law To Address
Petronas Stake in Iranian Fields, Tlm OIL DAILY, Volume 46, No. 207 1,
October 30, 1996 at 7; David Owen, Total, Petronas in Iran Venture, FI.
TIMEs, Aug. 19, 1996 at 4.
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